In case you were wondering what a stolen election looks like, this is it.
Russians went to the polls yesterday for what will be the last major round of voting before the presidential election next spring. Both the Kremlin and the opposition, of course, had points to prove. And both sides, it would seem, achieved something closely resembling their goals. United Russia handily won 16 out of the 16 gubernatorial elections held Sunday, including in Ekaterinburg, where the main opposition candidate wasn’t allowed on the ballot. The opposition, meanwhile, fielded a united front in the municipal council elections in Moscow and fared better than anyone could have expected, grabbing majorities in 10 districts.
The story of the grassroots movement that allowed the opposition to pull off that result is quite something, but that’s not what’s on my mind at the moment. The real question is, why didn’t the opposition win more?
The cells in Russia’s jails reserved for political prisoners, like nature, apparently abhor a vacuum.
No sooner had Russia’s prisons and labor colonies begun to discharge the last of the ‘Bolotnoe’ prisoners — jailed in the aftermath of the May 6, 2012, protests — than they began to fill up again with the participants in the March 26 and June 12, 2017, rallies.
Just today, a court in Moscow sentenced Rasim Iskakov to 2.5 years in a prison camp for throwing a petard at a police officer on June 12, a crime to which he admitted. His was the first jail sentence handed down for that rally (following a handful of fines, community service obligations and suspended sentences around the country), but it will likely not be the last. And that’s on top of the sentences issued for the March 26 protest: 4 years for Andrey Kosykh; 2.5 years for Stanislav Zimovets; 8 months for Yury Kuliy; 1.5 years for Aleksandr Shpakov; and numerous other defendants still awaiting trial or under investigation.
This is what Russia’s financial markets did in the aftermath of the announcement that the Government and Central Bank were moving to take over the country’s largest private lender, Otkrytie (see the news in English or Russian.) It is, of course, not what usually happens in such circumstances: stocks do not usually rise in the aftermath of such news, and currencies usually fall.
The fact that Russian financial markets are doing the opposite of what might have been expected is not a fluke. Russia has been cleaning up its banking sector in a major way for years, and that’s undoubtedly a good thing. But Russia also planted a bomb under the banking sector back in December 2014, when it jacked up interest rates in response to a massive currency collapse. Then, when rates began coming down, the Central Bank encouraged financial institutions to maintain above-market rates for savers in order to keep their balance-sheets stable. This was, most likely, the best stop-gap available at the time, but it was in truth a bailout delayed, not a bailout avoided.
If this were just question of allowing the Finance Ministry and Central Bank — both as professional as they come — to manage Russia’s banking sector in a calm and collected manner, that would be fine. But as I’ve written before, there is more to it than that. What we have been seeing in Russia ever since the economy began to deteriorate has been a shifting of financial power from modernized, independent and entrepreneurial sectors to the state-dominated resource sector. In that respect, the loss of Otkrytie is neither a new phenomenon nor even a turning point, but a further reminder of the kind of re-basing that has taken place across the Russian economy over the last few years.
As Russia returns to growth, then, it will do so on a foundation indistinguishable from the state.
If you thought Russia’s presidential election was going to be held in March 2018, you were wrong. The voting began today.
Every couple of days, the Twitter account for the King’s Russia Institute gets a ping, thanks to this tweet sent by the Russian Embassy in London back in early January:
There are two puzzles here. First, why did @RussianEmbassy – which has become something of a legend in the world of diplomatic trolling – copy the @KingsRussia into their tweet? Second, why are people still retweeting and replying to it, almost two months later? I’m no closer to solving the first question, but I might have discovered the answer to the second. (I’m not even going to try to figure out the significance of that frog.)
This has to stop now.
The thousands of Americans who have come out to say a resounding ‘no’ to the Trump regime’s attack on hundreds of thousands of Muslim travelers do not need me to tell them that. The shame instilled in me by my government is truly surpassed only by the pride I feel in my compatriots. They seem intuitively to understand the nature of what we’re dealing with.
Part of the problem with the whole debate around the role of ‘fake news’ in contemporary politics is that we sometimes have difficulty distinguishing between purposeful fakery and sloppy reporting: thus, Trump can claim Clinton got 3-5 million ‘illegal’ votes while lambasting reporters who mistakenly wrote that he had removed the bust of Martin Luther King Jr from the Oval Office.
Unfortunately, the problem is even worse in the world of academic research: while careful reading and a bit of thought can often uncover bad or disingenuous work, most non-academic readers – including a lot of the journalists who report on it – don’t go to those lengths.
A case in point is a Bloomberg article making the rounds, citing academic research purporting to prove that fake news had little or no effect on the US election. I’ll leave the journalist out of it (though he should know better, about which more later) and focus instead on the study, by economists Hunt Allcott and Mathew Gentzkow. It’s timely, important and methodologically advanced. It’s also spectacularly bad social science.